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IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN,
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Case No. 960194-CA
vs.
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON
and KIM ANDERSON,

Oral Argument Priority 15

Defendants-Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO
DEFENDANTS,
The trial court determined that, since defendants answered disclaiming any interest

in plaintiffs' property, plaintiffs' efforts to seek attorney fees were made in bad faith; the
trial court then awarded attorney fees to defendants, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, plaintiffs' request for attorney fees was not made in bad
faith, but was rather an attempt to seek reimbursement for attorney fees incurred as a result
of defendants' bad faith conduct.
A.

Defendants did not prevail on any substantive issue during the litigation
at the trial court level.

The trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants was error because the issue of
attorney fees, the only issue upon which defendants prevailed at the trial court level, is not a
substantive issue upon which an award of attorney fees can be justified. The clear language
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 states that "the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to
a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs prevailed on

the substantive issue of quieting title in their property. By awarding defendants attorney fees
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, the trial court determined that defendants were entitled to
an award of attorney fees because they prevailed on the issue of attorney fees. Plaintiffs
have been unable to find any case law justifying such an award, and neither defendants nor
the trial court have cited any such case law justifying this circular reasoning.
Defendants refer to Highland Construction Co. v. Stevenson. 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah
1981), to illustrate that a lawsuit can result in two prevailing parties. Plaintiffs do not
dispute this fact. However, in Highland both parties prevailed on substantive issues.
Highland, an excavating subcontractor, prevailed because Stevenson, the general contractor,
voluntarily paid Highland the amount Highland claimed it had not received under the party's
contract. Stevenson prevailed because the trial court found that Highland had breached its
contract with Stevenson. Only Stevenson was awarded attorney fees. The Utah Supreme
Court remanded the case for an award of attorney fees to Highland, based on the fact that
Highland had prevailed on one substantive issue. The fact that Stevenson had also prevailed
on another substantive issue did not preclude Highland from receiving an award of attorney
fees. Id. at 1038.
The present case can be distinguished from Highland in that both Highland and
Stevenson had prevailed on a substantive issue involved in the lawsuit, whereas defendants in
the case at hand did not. If this court affirms the trial court's award of attorney fees to
defendants, it will essentially be deleting from section 78-27-56 the requirement that a party
be a "prevailing party" in order to be entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to the bad faith
statute. Such approval will result in future decisions that will be both illogical and
unpredictable. The ends of justice will not be served by encouraging this type of faulty legal
analysis. For these reasons, plaintiffs respectfully request that this court reverse the trial
court's award of attorney fees to defendants.
B.

The trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to defendants pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 because plaintiffs' actions were
undertaken in good faith.

The trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants was based on Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-56, the bad faith statute, with the court apparently reasoning that the plaintiffs'
2

claim for attorney fees was not asserted in good faith pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3,
the quiet title statute, since defendants had disclaimed in their answer any interest in the
property. (R. at 169-70.) Plaintiffs* claim for attorney fees was asserted in good faith,
despite defendants' disclaiming any interest in the property, because of defendants' bad faith
conduct necessitating the filing of plaintiffs' complaint.
Defendants interpret plaintiffs' efforts to obtain a quit-claim deed from Defendant
Miller and a disclaimer of interest from Defendants Anderson as constituting a claim by the
plaintiffs that the defendants had an obligation to assist plaintiffs in quieting title to their
property. Such a claim, defendants argue, is without merit pursuant to Draper v. LB. &
R.E. Walker. Inc.. 204 P.2d 826 (Utah 1949), and Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield. 751
P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988). In both cases, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
award of damages to property owners who were forced to initiate legal action in order to
quiet title.
Contrary to defendants' assertions, plaintiffs have never argued that Defendant
Janice Miller had an obligation to assist plaintiffs in their efforts to quiet title in their
property. However, plaintiffs did seek documents verifying defendants' admitted lack of
interest in the property. The need for such documentation arose because, after years during
which both parties recognized and acquiesced in the fence line as constituting the boundary
between the parties' properties, as evidenced by Defendant Miller's execution of deeds and
filing of subdivision plat maps acknowledging the fence as the boundary line (R. at 31, 42,
46-48), defendants suddenly asserted an interest in plaintiffs' property adjacent to the fence
when plaintiffs finally began to subdivide parts of their property. At the June 15, 1994
meeting of the American Fork City Planning Commission Defendant Miller, on behalf of her
daughter and son-in-law Defendants Anderson, asserted an interest in the property pursuant
to Defendants Anderson's application for an occupancy permit. As a result of defendants'
unexpected assertion of interest in the property, the American Fork City Planning
Commission denied approval for plaintiffs' subdivision and building permits, as well as
denying the Anderson's application for an occupancy permit. The commission stated that
"the Chipmans would not get a building permit until the problem was solved." (R. at 64.)
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Defendants maintained that invalid assertion of interest for a period of ten months.
Had defendants never asserted that interest, or had they provided documentation relinquishing
any interest in the property when the law concerning boundary by acquiescence had been
made clear to them, there would have been no need for plaintiffs to instigate this lawsuit
against the defendants. However, plaintiffs were unable to proceed with the desired use of
their land until the American Fork City Planning Commission could be assured that the
dispute had been resolved.
Plaintiffs' quiet title claim had merit because of defendants' assertion and
maintenance, for a ten-month period, of an interest in plaintiffs' property after years of
conduct which evidenced no such claim. By maintaining an invalid assertion of interest for
almost a year, defendants knowingly interfered with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their
property rights, particularly their right to subdivide and use their property. Defendants later,
through their attorney, verbally disclaimed their interest in plaintiffs' property but refused to
execute written disclaimers or quit-claim deeds which would have verified to the American
Fork Planning Commission that the dispute had been resolved.
Under the circumstances, the only option plaintiffs had for obtaining such
documentation was to proceed with litigation. Because of defendants' stubborn refusal to
provide written confirmation documentation that they no longer claimed an interest in
plaintiffs' property, the plaintiffs were left with no other choice but to file suit. Therefore,
plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees incurred to obtain the confirmation was not made in bad
faith. Plaintiffs had a legitimate concern in seeking a quit-claim deed or disclaimer from
defendants because of defendants' own actions in this matter.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees was groundless because
Defendant Miller had signed a quitclaim deed to the property and Defendants Anderson had
never claimed an interest in the property. However, the quitclaim deed signed by Defendant
Miller was not provided to plaintiffs until April 14, 1995, over a month after the filing of
plaintiffs' complaint and ten months after she had first asserted an interest in the property.
During that ten-month period, plaintiffs had incurred significant legal expenses in attempting
to convince Defendant Miller that her assertion of interest in the plaintiffs' property was
invalid. As to the Defendants Anderson, Defendant Miller had represented to plaintiffs, their
4

counsel, and the American Fork City Planning Commission that Defendants Anderson's
property interests were involved and that Defendants Anderson would not sign a quitclaim
deed because they needed additional footage beyond the fence line in order to occupy their
property. Defendants Anderson did not respond to a demand letter from plaintiffs' counsel;
accordingly, Defendants Anderson were included as named defendants in plaintiffs'
complaint. Defendants Anderson did not disclaim any interest in the property until after the
complaint had been filed. For these reasons, plaintiffs' complaint against Defendant Miller
and Defendants Anderson was made in good faith.
Defendants also argue that plaintiffs' conduct evidenced bad faith because plaintiffs
failed to bring the case of Draper v. J.B. & R.E. Walker. Inc.. 204 P.2d 826 (1949) to the
court's notice and failed to abandon their claim for attorney fees after defendants disclosed
that case to the court and to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did not feel this case was relevant to their
suit and accordingly did not feel it their responsibility to bring this case to the court's notice,
nor did plaintiffs feel that the case was a "controlling adverse decision" which mandated
abandonment of plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees. Plaintiffs take the same position
concerning the case of Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield. 751 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988), also
cited by defendants.

Both of these cases are distinguishable from the case at hand and deal

with claims for damages. References in the Utah Code to "damages", as pointed out later in
Section II C of this brief, are not the equivalent to "attorneys fees".
By awarding attorney fees to defendants under these circumstances, the trial court
inappropriately rewarded defendants for intentionally provoking unnecessary litigation.
Because this lawsuit was provoked by defendants' bad faith conduct, plaintiffs' claims for
attorney fees did indeed have merit. Accordingly, the trial court's award of attorney fees to
defendants should be reversed.
C.

Absent any bad faith on plaintiffs' part, the trial court's award of
attorney fees to defendants should be reversed.

Defendants also argue that, absent any evidence of bad faith on plaintiffs' part, the
trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants should nonetheless be affirmed based upon
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and Utah R. Civ. P. 11 because plaintiffs "could not have made
a reasonable inquiry" which would have revealed that neither the statute nor case law
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authorize or support an award of pre-complaint attorney's fees. This argument is based upon
defendants' belief that plaintiffs should agree that an award of "attorney fees" is prohibited
(a) by case law prohibiting an award of "damages" and (b) by a statute prohibiting an award
of "costs."
Plaintiffs' interpretation of statutes and case law which might justify or prohibit an
award of attorney fees does not constitute bad faith. The fact that plaintiffs did not consider
the cases upon which defendants rely to be applicable, much less controlling, to plaintiffs'
claim for attorney fees does not mean plaintiffs failed to make a reasonable inquiry into
relevant law. Although contrary to defendants' interpretation, plaintiffs' interpretation is
reasonable and plaintiffs' conduct pursuant to that interpretation does not provide justification
for the trial court's finding that plaintiffs acted in bad faith in pursuing that claim.
When a party's position is subject to reasonable interpretation, conduct based on
that interpretation does not constitute bad faith. In the case of Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar
Co.. 684 P.2d 307 (Idaho App. 1984), the lessee of a farm sought judgment against
Amalgamated Sugar Company, a crop purchaser, for payment to lessee of his share of
proceeds by separate checks rather than paying the full amount by joint checks which
included the landowner lessor as an additional payee. The landowner intervened in the case,
and the trial court awarded attorney fees against the landowner lessor under an Idaho statute
authorizing an award of attorney fees for frivolously bringing, pursuing or defending a civil
case. The trial court determined that the landowner's intervention deviated from reasonable
standards of conduct and was frivolously and unreasonably brought and pursued. The
appellate court disagreed and reversed the award of attorney fees:
A misperception of law or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself,
unreasonable conduct. It if were, virtually every case controlled by a
question of law would entail an attorney fee award against the losing party
under I.C. § 12-121. Rather, the question must be whether the position
adopted by the owner was not only incorrect but so plainly fallacious that
it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.
Id. at 313. The court went on to state that, "[ajlthough [procedural questions] have been
decided adversely to the owner, the issues were genuine and fairly debatable." Id.
Accordingly, the fact that plaintiffs in the present case disagree with defendants as to the
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interpretation and relevancy of certain case law is not sufficient for a finding of bad faith on
plaintiffs' part which would justify the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Indeed, given that plaintiffs dispute the relevance and
effect of these cases on the present case, it is odd that defendants should accuse plaintiffs of
inadequate reasonable inquiry for their failure to bring the Draper case to the attention of the
court and conduct themselves in accordance with the Draper decision when defendants
themselves did not cite the Draper case (a case they claim to be in their favor as a
controlling case), until after all of the parties' pleadings had been submitted.
It is ridiculous to expect plaintiffs to have anticipated and addressed defendants'
logic in construing case law, let alone agree with it, prior to plaintiffs' reading of that logic
in defendants' pleadings. Because plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees was not made in bad
faith, the trial court erred in awarding defendants attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56. Therefore, the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants should rest
solely on Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the basis for the trial court's decision that plaintiffs
acted in bad faith when pursuing their claim for attorney fees. If this court finds the trial
court erred in attributing bad faith conduct to plaintiffs, then the trial court's award of
attorney fees to defendants should be reversed.
H.

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES.
Plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees was made pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-

56, the bad faith statute, which allows attorney fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in
civil cases when "the action or defense to the action was without merit and not. . . asserted
in good faith." Because of defendants' bad faith conduct, plaintiffs, as the prevailing party
in the substantive issues of this case, are entitled to attorney fees despite the prohibition
against "costs" in Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3.
A.

Plaintiffs prevailed on all the substantive issues in this action.

Plaintiffs filed suit in this matter to quiet title in their property. Plaintiffs achieved
the object of their suit when defendants disclaimed any interest in the property. This makes
plaintiffs the prevailing party in the action and satisfies the prevailing-party requirement of
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Therefore, upon the court's determination that defendants acted
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in bad faith, thereby unnecessarily provoking the litigation, plaintiffs are entitled to
attorney's fees in this matter.
B.

Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7827-56 because defendants acted in bad faith, thereby unnecessarily
provoking litigation.

Although defendants disclaimed their interest in plaintiffs' property in the
defendants' answer to plaintiffs' complaint, the defendants' conduct for almost a year
evidenced their bad faith efforts to interfere with plaintiffs' fundamental property rights. For
many years, both parties had recognized and acquiesced in the fence line as representing the
boundary between their properties. When defendants suddenly asserted an interest in
plaintiffs' property adjacent to the fence, the plaintiffs' subdivision and building permit were
denied. Plaintiffs were unable to use and subdivide their property until April 14, 1995, when
Defendant Miller signed and tendered a quitclaim deed to the plaintiffs' attorney.
Defendants are wrong when they advance a policy argument suggesting that if
property owners are allowed reimbursement for attorney fees incurred when seeking
disclaimers of invalid interests that will prompt property owners to unreasonably and without
basis imagine a claim might, at some unknown future date, be made against their property.
This assumes that a plaintiff would instigate legal action without provocation. The opposite
could, and in the present case does, exist: Persons who know they have no valid interest in
another's property can pursue or provoke unnecessary litigation by frivolously asserting an
invalid interest to that property, thereby intentionally interfering with the landowner's
property rights, without having to recompense the other party for either the legal expenses
incurred in rebutting that claim or the inconvenience or damages resulting from the
infringement of the landowner's property rights.
The case law cited by defendants states there is no affirmative duty to disclaim an
invalid interest in property; presumably the purpose here is to protect a party from the type
of scenarios presented by defendants. However, it would be inequitable and against public
policy to apply those laws to a case in which the party seeking to invoke that case law took
affirmative actions to assert an invalid interest which resulted in lengthy delay, inconvenience
and expense to the landowner.
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In the present case, defendants certainly provoked plaintiffs into filing and pursuing
this lawsuit by asserting an interest which defendants knew had no basis in law or in fact.
Defendants' conduct made it impossible for plaintiffs to enjoy their fundamental property
rights. Given Defendant Miller's past conduct in acknowledging the fence line as the
boundary line, her sudden assertion of an interest in the property adjacent to the fence line
evidences her knowing intention "to take an unconscionable advantage of [plaintiffs] . . .
[and to] . . . hinder, delay or defraud" plaintiffs. Cady v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151
(Utah 1983).
Plaintiffs' actions in seeking to quiet title to their property were made necessary by
defendants' bad faith conduct. Defendants admit that had Defendant Miller maintained her
unreasonable position after plaintiffs' complaint was filed, "plaintiffs might have had cause to
seek attorney fees." Because defendants made no defense to plaintiffs' quiet title claim,
defendants now claim that their defense was not made in bad faith when it was in fact
defendants' conduct which provoked unnecessary litigation.
Public policy should not allow one party, knowing his claim to be invalid, to cause
another to incur legal costs without requiring the offending party to reimburse the other.
Here, plaintiffs incurred significant legal expenses attempting to resolve this matter outside of
court. Notions of judicial economy should find such efforts admirable and desirable.
However, denying plaintiffs reimbursement for those expenses would serve to discourage
future attempts to avoid unnecessary litigation in such situations.
C.

"Attorney fees11 are separate and distinct from "costs" and "damages,"
and plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to the
statutes involved in this case.

The trial court based its denial of plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees on Utah Code
Ann. § 78-40-3, the quiet title statute, which prohibits an award of "costs" against a
defendant who disclaims in his answer any interest in the property involved in a quiet title
action. However, the statute says nothing about prohibiting an award of "attorney fees."
Utah statutes generally do distinguish between "costs," "damages," and "attorney fees."
Indeed, an examination of the index to the Utah Code reveals numerous examples of statutes
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separately addressing "costs" or "attorney fees," and many others which address both "costs"
and "attorney fees."1
The general rule, also known as the American rule, concerning attorney fees is that
"[fjees paid to attorneys are ordinarily not recoverable from the opposing party as costs, in
the absence of express statutory or contractual authority authorizing the taxing of attorney's
fees as costs." 20 Am. Jur.2d Costs § 57. An example of a statute authorizing the taxing of
attorney fees as costs is seen in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, which states that, "in any action
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover
a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
action." In United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co.. 185 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.
1950), the United States District Court for the District of Utah acknowledged that "[t]he right
to recover attorney's fees as part of the cost of an action did not exist at common law. In
the absence of an agreement, the right thereto is purely statutory." Id. at 448. The court
then determined that the contract between the parties controlled in that situation because no
statute dealing with attorney fees existed for that type of case. &.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that, "In construing constitutional as well as
statutory provisions, it is to be assumed that the words used were chosen advisedly, and
terms should be given an interpretation and an application in accord with their commonly
understood meaning." Nephi City v. Hansen. 779 P.2d 673 (Utah 1989). The plain
language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the quiet title statute under which the trial court
denied plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees, merely prohibits an award of "costs" and says
nothing whatsoever about "attorney fees." Indeed, an examination of the two statutes

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1(3) (authorizing an award of "all costs of collection,
including all court costs and reasonable attorney fees"); § 16-10a-1331 (authorizing an
assessment of costs, fees, and expenses of counsel and experts); § 57-15-9 (authorizing
"actual damages plus all reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by the injured party"); §
57-16-8 (authorizing "court costs and reasonable attorney's fees"); § 67-21-5 (authorizing "all
or a portion of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees"); §
78-11-10 (authorizing "payment to the defendant of all costs and expenses that may be
awarded against such plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the
court").
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involved in this case shows that Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3 prohibits an award of "costs"
when a defendant's answer disclaims interest in property, whereas Utah Code Ann. § 78-2756 requires an award of "attorney fees" when bad faith is proven. The fact that these two
statutes distinguish between "costs" and "attorney fees" is evidence that Utah law does not
consider them to be interchangeable terms. This supports plaintiffs' argument that the trial
court erred in denying plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees based on the language of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-40-3.
Defendants argue that, even if the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' claim for
attorney fees based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the trial court's decision should be
affirmed because there is other appropriate justification for the decision. Defendants cite
both the Draper and Nield cases in support of their argument that, because there is no duty
to affirmatively disclaim an invalid interest, damages cannot be awarded against a person
who refuses to do so. Neither the Draper nor Nield decisions were based on Utah Code
Ann. 78-27-56, which is the basis of the plaintiffs' claim.

For the purposes of the argument

that Draper and Nield are somehow on point and controlling cases on this issue, defendants
apparently consider "attorney fees" the equivalent of "damages"; however, defendants have
cited no cases equating the two. (Although the Draper court reversed the trial court's award
of damages, including attorney fees, on the ground that there is no duty to affirmatively
disclaim an invalid interest, it did so without addressing the question of whether "attorney
fees" should be considered "damages.")
While urging this court to accept Draper and Nield and their prohibitions against
any award of "damages" as controlling case law, defendants also cite Arnica Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), which state that "[attorney fees are
more properly considered costs" as opposed to damages. It seems that defendants wish to
equate "attorney fees" with "damages" in order to find the Draper and Nield cases applicable
to the present case, while simultaneously equating "attorney fees" with "costs" in order to
find Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3 applicable. In attempting to argue that attorney fees should
be considered "damages" on the one hand and "costs" on the other hand, defendants
themselves illustrate the confusion which often results when statutory language is loosely
interpreted.
11

As defendants acknowledge, the trial court did not rely on the Draper or Nield
cases in denying plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees. Rather, the trial court relied on Utah
Code Ann. § 78-40-3, which prohibits an award of "costs" but says nothing about prohibiting
an award of "attorney fees." Plaintiffs seek reversal of the trial court's denial of their claim
for attorney fees because "attorney fees" do not equal "costs."
Defendants further argue that the Nield and Draper cases establish that there is no
right of action in Utah for recovery of pre-complaint damages for failure to disclaim an
interest in property. While plaintiffs are aware of no case law approving an award of prelitigation attorney fees, neither have defendants cited any case law holding such an award to
be inappropriate. In fact, defendants' counsel prevailed on a previous appeal before the Utah
Supreme Court on the issue of awarding attorney fees for the preparation of a complaint.
Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982). Unlike the present case, the award of
attorney fees in Alexander was based on a contract; however, Alexander does support
plaintiffs' argument that, at a minimum, attorney fees incurred in the preparation of the
plaintiffs' complaint can appropriately be awarded along with subsequent attorney fees
incurred in bringing or defending against a lawsuit. When, as here, a party is forced to
initiate legal action to protect themselves and their property rights from an affirmatively
asserted invalid interest, Nield and Draper ought not be used to protect the party whose
conduct knowingly and unnecessarily provoked the litigation.
Regardless of whether or not pre-litigation attorney fees are awarded in this case,
the trial court erred in using the amount of attorney fees requested by plaintiffs as a factor
when denying plaintiffs attorney fees. If a trial court determines that the amount of attorney
fees requested is excessive, it has the discretion to reduce the amount of attorney fees it
awards without denying attorney fees completely or inappropriately awarding attorney fees to
the non-prevailing party. Even if as a result of this litigation this court articulates case law
that denies plaintiffs pre-litigation attorney fees, the trial court here should have made an
award of post-litigation attorney fees to plaintiffs. The trial court chose instead to completely
deny any award of attorney fees to plaintiffs, and under the facts of this case, that decision
was in error and should be reversed.

12

Plaintiffs in the present case argue that Utah statutes do differentiate between
"costs" and "attorney fees11, pursuant to the legislature's intentions. The plain language of
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3 does not prohibit an award of attorney fees to plaintiffs in this
case, and this court should reverse the trial court's denial of attorney fees based on that
statute.
HI.

DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DOUBLE COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL.
Defendants seek, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 33(a), an award of double costs and

attorney fees incurred in responding to this appeal. Defendants' arguments are based upon
their assertion that plaintiffs' appeal is frivolous because the Draper and Nield cases provided
plaintiffs with "actual notice that existing Utah law barred plaintiffs' action." As discussed
above, plaintiffs dispute the applicability of these cases to the present case and therefore,
contrary to defendants' assertions, had no obligation to affirmatively bring these cases up,
and then distinguish them, when arguing for summary disposition. For the same reasons,
plaintiffs' appeal of the trial court's judgment is not frivolous and defendants should not be
awarded reimbursement for any expenses incurred as a result of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Although defendants ultimately did provide plaintiffs with the necessary
documentation disclaiming any interest in plaintiffs' property subsequent to the filing of
plaintiffs' claim, it was defendants' own conduct that made it necessary for plaintiffs to go to
court in the first place. Had Defendant Miller not asserted an interest she knew to be
invalid, and had she not stubbornly clung to that position with the intention to hinder, delay,
defraud or take advantage of plaintiffs, it would not have been necessary for plaintiffs to
incur attorney fees involved in a quiet title action. Under these circumstances, which
demonstrate defendants' bad faith, plaintiffs were justified in filing their quiet title claim and
///
///
///
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are entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to the bad faith statute. For these reasons,
this appeal is not frivolous and defendants should not be awarded double costs and attorney
fees, and the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants should be reversed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

U

day of

1996.

GORDON DUVAL
Attorney for Appellants
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